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Abstract 
Regulations in the pre-Sarbanes–Oxley era allowed corporate insiders considerable flexibility 
in strategically timing their trades and SEC filings, for example, by executing several trades 
and reporting them jointly after the last trade. We document that even these lax reporting 
requirements were frequently violated and that the strategic timing of trades and reports was 
common. Event study abnormal re-turns are larger after reports of strategic insider trades than 
after reports of otherwise similar nonstrategic trades. Our results also imply that delayed 
reporting is detrimental to market efficiency and lend strong support to the more stringent 
trade reporting requirements established by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act.  
 
 
JEL Classification: G14, G30, G32 
 
 
Keywords: Insider Trading, Directors' Dealings, Corporate Governance, Market Efficiency    1 
Corporate insiders arguably know more about the prospects of their firms than other market par-
ticipants. This hypothesis is supported by a host of papers documenting that insider trades, and 
purchases in particular, convey information to the market (e.g., Seyhun (1986) and Chang and 
Suk (1998) for the US; Fidrmuc et al. (2006) and Friederich et al. (2002) for the UK). The US 
and many other countries have adopted regulations that require corporate insiders to report their 
trades.
1 The model of Huddart et al. (2001) provides a theoretical justification for these regul a-
tions. The authors show that information is reflected more rapidly in prices when insiders have to 
disclose their trades. Several empirical papers (e.g., Chang and Suk (1998), Betzer and Theissen 
(2009)) have shown that share price reactions occur on both the trading and reporting dates. Thus, 
without the report the market is unable to infer the full information co ntent of the trade, which 
implies that market prices are distorted in the period between the trading and reporting dates. De-
layed reporting, then, may be detrimental to market efficiency. 
In the era prior to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX), Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act re-
quired corporate insiders in the US to report their trades by the 10th of the month following the 
trade. Thus, the maximum time allowed between the trade and the report was 40 days, allowing 
corporate insiders considerable flexibility to time their trades and reports. This flexibility could 
be used strategically. An insider wishing to trade a large quantity could split up the order into 
                                                 
1  Some countries (e.g., the UK) even prohibit trading by corporate insiders in certain circumstances. Similarly, 
many listed firms in the US have adopted policies restricting trading by insiders (Bettis et al. (2000)).  
   2 
several smaller chunks. Splitting up a large order reduces the order‘s price impact and thus results 
in reduced execution costs (e.g., Kyle (1985), Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004)). However, if 
the insider reported each individual trade immediately, the share price reaction on the reporting 
day would move the price against her, and the subsequent trades would occur at less favorable 
prices. Consequently, the insider has an incentive to delay the reporting of a series of trades until 
after the last transaction. By doing so, insiders can benefit from the reduced price impacts of split-
up trades while avoiding the adverse price reaction that immediate reports would trigger. The 
present paper analyzes incidences of strategically timed U.S. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) filings. We identify a trade as strategic whenever it is either followed by another trade 
by the same insider before it is reported or executed after another trade by the same insider that 
has not yet been reported. 
Note that the incentive to strategically time trades and reports does not depend on the assumption 
that the insider trades on private information. The only assumption necessary for our argument is 
that other market participants believe that insiders possess private information with a positive 
probability. The stylized fact that prices react to the publication of insider trades supports this 
assumption. 
This paper asks four related questions. First, how long are reporting delays during the pre-SOX 
era? Second, do insiders strategically use their flexibility in choosing the timing and reporting of 
their trades, and, if so, is this strategic behavior systematically related to the characteristics of the   3 
insider or the firm? Third, what are the implications of delayed reporting on market efficiency? 
Fourth, how does the market react to the strategic timing of trades and reports? 
The first question is important because, as argued above, delayed reporting can be detrimental to 
market efficiency. The relevance of the second question derives from the observation that strateg-
ic timing benefits the insider at the expense of other market participants. If each trade were re-
ported immediately, the second and subsequent trades of a series of insider trades would be ex-
ecuted at prices less favorable to the insider but more favorable to the insider‘s counterparties. 
The answer to the third question allows us to assess the relevance of the issues addressed in this 
paper. The fourth question is important because its answer enables one to draw inferences on the 
trading motives of insiders engaging in strategic timing. On reporting dates, market participants 
learn whether the strategic delaying of reports has taken place. If market participants believe that 
insiders  possessing  private  information  are  more  likely  to  time  their  trades  and  reports,  one 
should observe a larger price reaction than that for an otherwise similar but nonstrategic trade. 
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, reporting delays were substantial. The mean re-
porting delay was 35.0 days and the median was 24 days, with 13.2% of all trades in our sample 
reported later than on the 10th of the month following the trade. The very large number of viola-
tions of the trade reporting requirement implies that the requirement was apparently not enforced. 
In fact, we were unable to detect even a single case in which an insider was fined because of late 
reporting. We further find clear evidence of strategic trading. Only 32.1% of the trades in our   4 
sample were nonstrategic trades (i.e., these trades were reported before the same insider traded 
again, and they were not preceded by a trade by the same insider that had not yet been reported). 
Logit models reveal that the occurrence of both late filings and strategic trades is systematically 
related to firm, trade, and trader characteristics. In particular, the results are consistent with the 
notion that insiders who are more closely monitored (and who therefore may be facing higher 
litigation risks) are less likely to file their trades late. 
Consistent with previous findings, our event study results show that share prices react to the re-
porting of insider trades. The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over 10- and 20-day windows 
are larger after purchases than after sales. In cross-sectional regressions we find that the magni-
tude of the price reaction decreases only slowly in the reporting delay (after insider sales), or not 
at all (after purchases). Thus, our results support the notion that market prices are distorted in the 
period between a trade and its report, which supports our conjecture that delayed reporting is de-
trimental to market efficiency. Finally, event study CARs are larger after reports of strategic in-
sider trades than after reports of otherwise similar nonstrategic trades. Thus, market participants 
apparently believe that insiders acting strategically are more likely to possess private information. 
Our results clearly support the more stringent trade reporting requirements established by SOX. 
They also suggest that countries that currently allow longer reporting delays should consider re-
vising and/or enforcing their regulations. Recent evidence reported in Fidrmuc et al. (2008) sug-
gests that some countries do not yet mandate and enforce timely trade reporting. Using recent   5 
samples (ending May 2007), the authors find median reporting delays of five days for Italy, seven 
days for Belgium, and 14 days for France. 
Our paper is related to four recent papers by Cheng et al. (2007), Betzer and Theissen (2010), 
Brochet (2010), and Lebedeva et al. (2009). Cheng et al. (2007) exploit the feature that corporate 
insiders in the US could, in certain circumstances, delay the reporting of non-open market trades 
until the end of the fiscal year of the firm (SEC Form 5 trades). The authors find that insider sales 
by top executives in Standard & Poor‘s (S&P) 500 firms disclosed in such a delayed manner pre-
dict negative future returns and lower operating profitability relative to analyst forecasts. Insider 
purchases, on the other hand, are hardly predictive of future returns. Cheng et al. (2007) conclude 
that ―managers in large firms may have used late-disclosure Form 5 sales for information-based 
trading‖ (p. 1861). Betzer and Theissen (2010) use data from Germany to show that substantial 
reporting delays are common, that the delays are systematically related to firm characteristics, and 
that abnormal returns after the reporting dates of insider trades are independent of the reporting 
delays. The latter finding implies that prices are distorted in the period between the trading and 
reporting dates. Brochet (2010) focuses on differences in the information content of insider trades 
before and after SOX. The author regresses event study CARs on a set of explanatory variables, 
including the reporting delay, and finds that price reactions after purchases are weaker when 
trades are reported with longer lags, but that the reverse is true for insider sales. Lebedeva et al. 
(2009) find strong evidence that corporate insiders in the US break up larger trades into series of   6 
smaller trades. The authors refer to this as stealth trading. They also find that liquidity-based ex-
planations for this behavior have more explanatory power than information-based explanations. 
Our paper differs from these previous papers in that it is the first paper to systematically docu-
ment strategic trade reporting and to analyze the determinants and implications of this phenome-
non. It further differs from Cheng et al. (2007) in that we do not analyze the relatively small sam-
ple of non-open market trades eligible for late reporting but, rather, the much larger sample of all 
insider trades that had to be filed on SEC Form 4.
2 Betzer and Theissen (2010) analyze reporting 
delays in Germany but have a much smaller sample (1,977 observations as compared to 314,696 
in the present paper), and the regulatory regime in Germany is distinctly different from that in the 
US. Brochet (2010) includes a reporting delay variable in his analysis but interprets it as a control 
variable measuring the information leakage between trading and reporting dates. Furthermore, his 
sample is much smaller than ours because his sample starts in 1997 and only includes trades by 
the chief executive officer (CEO), the chief financial officer (CFO), the chief operating officer 
(COO), the board chair, and the president. Lebedeva et al. (2009) focus on the motives for stealth 
trading but do not analyze late filings or how reporting delays affect CARs on the reporting dates. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section I describes the data set and presents 
descriptive statistics. Section II presents evidence on delayed trade reporting. Section III deter-
                                                 
2  The number of Form 5 sales (purchases) for S&P 500 stocks during 1998–2001 amounts to 438 (419). The cor-
responding figures for Form 4 trades are 10,166 and 7,217, respectively (Cheng et al. (2007), Table 1D).    7 
mines whether incidences of strategic trading and trade reporting took place and also analyzes 
whether so-called strategic trades are systematically different from nonstrategic trades. Section IV 
uses event study methodology to compare market responses to strategic and nonstrategic trades. 
Section V presents our conclusions. 
I.  Data 
Our analysis requires data on insider trades, firm characteristics, and stock prices. The data selec-
tion process follows that of Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Marin and Olivier (2008) and merges 
data from four different sources, namely, the TFN Insider Filing Data Files, the Center for Re-
search in Security Prices (CRSP) database, the Compustat database, and the I/B/E/S database. 
The initial sample consists of insider trades reported on SEC Form 4 in companies listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, or the NASDAQ during 1992–2001. 
It covers the last 10 calendar years before the implementation of SOX, which enacted a regime 
change, since it requires insiders to report a trade within two working days. 
We start our sample construction with the TFN database. We include all open market or private 
purchases (transaction code P) and all open market or private sales (transaction code S) of nonde-
rivative securities whose records were not amended (amendment indicator ―blank‖) between Jan-
uary 1, 1992, and December 31, 2001. Of these transactions, we retain only those filings whose 
data can be verified by TFN with a high level of confidence (cleanse indicators R and H). The 
TFN Insider Filing Data Files contain the following information:   8 
  The company name and CUSIP. 
  The transaction date and the reporting date (SEC receipt date). 
  The transaction code (purchase or sale), the number of shares exchanged in the transac-
tion, and the transaction price. 
  The insider‘s position within the firm, which we classify into four groups: 
  The CEO (also possibly the chairman of the board). 
  Chairman (only if not also the CEO). 
  Executive directors, excluding the CEO. 
  Other non-executive officers, affiliates, beneficial owners, or other persons required to 
report their trades. 
We exclude all filings that have no entry in either the transaction price, number of shares, report-
ing date to SEC, position of insider, or sector fields, leaving us with 741,653 records. We also 
exclude insider transactions whenever the reported transaction price was not inside a 20% interval 
around the CRSP closing price on the insider trading day. We further exclude trades when the 
number of shares traded exceeded 20% of the total shares outstanding. We do not attempt to sin-
gle out Rule 10b5-1 trades because very few of these pre-planned trades took place during the 
pre-SOX  era. Brochet  (2010), using a sample covering 1997–2002, reports that Rule 10b5-1 
trades accounted for only 0.55% of the trades in his sample.   9 
We complement the data on insider transactions with supplementary data from different sources. 
We obtain financial data from the Compustat database. All data items are taken from the firms‘ 
financial statements at the end of the fiscal year preceding the reporting of the insider trades. We 
measure book leverage (the variable bookleverage) as the ratio of long-term debt (data item 9) 
plus debt in current liabilities (item 34) to long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities plus 
stockholder equity (item 216). Firm size (size) is defined as the natural logarithm of the market 
value of equity. Tobin‘s Q (Q) is calculated as the ratio of the market value of assets to the book 
value of total assets (item 6). Following Malmendier and Tate (2007), we define the market value 
of assets as total assets plus market equity (item 25 times item 199) minus book equity. We calcu-
late book equity as the sum of stockholder equity and balance sheet deferred taxes and investment 
tax credit (item 35), where available, minus the preferred stock liquidating value (item 10) and 
minus post-retirement assets (item 336), where available.
3 
Furthermore, we obtain data on analysts‘ forecasts and the announcement dates of quarterly or 
annual earnings reports from the I/B/E/S and Compustat databases. We define our variable num-
est as the total number of analysts covering a company in the last available yearly earnings fore-
cast before the transaction date of the insider trade. We further obtain the dates of all quarterly 
earnings announcements.  
                                                 
3  When stockholder equity was not available as data item 216, we calculated stockholder equity alternatively as 
common equity (item 60) plus the preferred stock par value (item 130) or total assets minus total liabilities (item 
181). If the preferred stock liquidating value was not available as data item 10, we calculated the preferred stock   10 
For an observation to be included in our analysis, all the necessary data items in the CRSP, Com-
pustat, and I/B/E/S databases must be available. This requirement reduces the sample to 314,696 
observations. 
In our empirical analysis we use the following additional variables. The delay variable is the dif-
ference in days between the reporting and transaction dates. We calculate the variable TradeVo-
lume as the number of shares exchanged in a transaction times the transaction price divided by the 
market value of equity. We define NumInsider as the total number of insiders who traded shares 
in the same company on the same day. Table I summarizes the definitions of these variables. 
Insert Table I about here 
Our analysis uses two different data sets: a ―transaction sample‖ and an ―event study sample.‖ For 
the transaction sample we aggregate all transactions by the same insider that are a) executed on 
the same day and b) jointly reported on the same day. We present an aggregated transaction as 
one trade with the net amount traded. The (net) transaction volume is positive (negative) if the 
sum of all the individual trades by this particular insider on the trading day is positive (negative). 
After these calculations, we classify each aggregated transaction as a purchase or a sale. Our final 
transaction sample consists of 98,933 purchases and 215,763 sales (314,696 observations in to-
tal). The announcement date in our event study analysis is the day on which an insider trade was 
                                                                                                                                                              
liquidating value alternatively as redemption value (item 56) or par value (item 130). Return on equity (the varia-
ble RoE) is net income (item 172) divided by book equity.   11 
filed with the SEC. Therefore, we aggregate all insider trades in the shares of a given firm that 
were reported on the same day, irrespective of whether the trades were reported by the same in-
sider or different insiders. We refer to this sample as our event study sample. Again, aggregated 
transactions are treated as one trade, and the net trade direction and net volume are as defined 
above.  The  final  data  set  for  the  event  study  consists  of  34,648  purchases  and  65,319  sales 
(99,967 trades in total). 
Table II presents the descriptive statistics for the firms in our sample. The average firm size, as 
measured by the market value of equity, is $4544.39 million. The firm size distribution is heavily 
skewed. The average Tobin's Q of the sample firms is 3.52, the average return on equity is 8.90%, 
and the mean book leverage is 31.43%. The mean trade size, expressed as a percentage of the 
market value of equity, is 0.121%. In 62.10% of cases, only one insider traded on a given day. In 
the remaining cases, more than one insider traded on the same day. The average number of insid-
ers trading on a given day is 2.04, with a maximum of 32. The average insider trade was executed 
57.0 calendar days before the firm reported its next annual or quarterly earnings report. 
Insert Table II about here 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the trading dates. Although it appears to follow a weak U-
shaped pattern, the general impression from Figure 1 is that trades are more or less evenly distri-
buted over the month. The distribution of reporting dates, shown in Figure 2, is, however, dramat-
ically different. The daily frequencies start low (only 0.81% of trades are reported on the first day   12 
of the month) and then increase strongly until the 10th of the month. Almost 32% of all the trades 
are reported on this day alone. When we weight the trades by their volume, this number increases 
further to 42.7%. After the 10th, the frequencies decline sharply. In the second half of the month, 
there is no single day on which more than 0.75% of the trades are reported. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
There are two not mutually exclusive (and observationally equivalent) explanations for the strong 
pattern we document. First, many corporate insiders may routinely report trades made during the 
previous month on the 10th. This practice may hamper market efficiency and may be to the dis-
advantage of other traders (although not intentionally). Whenever share prices react to the report-
ing of an insider trade, reporting delays imply distorted prices in the period between the trading 
and filing dates. If an insider executes several trades on different days but reports them jointly, the 
later trades are executed at prices that are more favorable than they would have been in the case 
where each trade had been reported immediately. This is beneficial for the insider but obviously 
to the disadvantage of the counterparties to the insider‘s trades. Second, some insiders may inten-
tionally delay the reporting of their trades to avoid the price impact triggered by the report. By 
considering only the trading and filing dates, the two cases mentioned cannot be distinguished 
from each other. However, the share price reaction on the filing date can be expected to reflect the   13 
market‘s beliefs about the insiders‘ motives. Therefore, analyzing the price reaction will allow us 
to draw inferences about these motives and the economic significance of strategic trade reporting. 
II.  Reporting Delays 
This section presents evidence concerning the magnitude of reporting delays and the determinants 
of late filings. The frequency distributions of trading and reporting dates shown in Figure 1 and 
Figure 2 demonstrate that trades are approximately evenly distributed over the month, whereas 
reports cluster around the 10th. If insider trades were indeed equally distributed over the days of 
the month and if each trade were reported on the 10th of the month after the trade (i.e., on the last 
permissible day), we would expect an average reporting delay of approximately 25 days. Table III 
shows the actual reporting delays. The median delay (24 days for purchases and sales) corres-
ponds roughly to the benchmark value derived above. The mean delay is much longer, at 35.0 
days.
4 Purchases are reported with longer delays than sales (4 0.4 days, compared to 32.5 days, 
respectively). This  difference may be indicative of strategic delaying , because previous papers 
(e.g., Seyhun (1986) and Brochet (2010) for the US, and Fidrmuc et al. (2006) for the UK) docu-
ment that insider purchases are more informative, as evidenced by larger abnormal returns. This 
finding, in turn, implies that insiders who purchase shares ar e more likely to possess private in-
formation and therefore have greater incentives to conceal their trading activity. 
                                                 
4  This figure is greater than that given in Table 1 of Brochet (2010). The author uses a shorter sample period (start-
ing in 1997) and confines his analysis to trades initiated by the CEO, CFO, COO, board chairs, and presidents.    14 
Insert Table III about here 
The discrepancy between the mean and median reporting delays implies that the distribution of 
reporting delays is heavily skewed. The magnitude of the average delay further implies that a sig-
nificant fraction of trades, particularly the purchases, are reported too late (i.e., later than the 10th 
of the month following the trade). In fact, Table III reveals that 13.2% of the trades in our sample 
were reported too late.
5 We use the term late filings for these cases. Late filings are more com-
mon for purchases than for sales (17.5%, compared to 11.3%, respectively). 
The high percentage of late filings is stunning and implies that in the pre-SOX era, reporting re-
quirements were not enforced. In fact, we were unable to identify even a single case in which a 
corporate insider was fined for late filing. This is all the more surprising because violations of the 
reporting requirement are easily detectable: The TFN database contains the trading and reporting 
dates together with a unique person identification number that allows for the insider‘s easy identi-
fication.  
The percentage of late filings is too large to be explained by accidental omissions. Rather, a sub-
stantial fraction of insiders exists who do not care about the reporting requirements or who deli-
berately (and maybe strategically) file their reports late. To shed light on the issue, we estimate a 
logit model where the dependent variable is zero if a trade was reported in time (i.e., by the 10th 
                                                 
5  These figures take into account the fact that when the 10th of a month is a Saturday or a Sunday, the trade only 
needs to be reported on the 12th or the 11th of the month, respectively.    15 
of the month following the trade), and one if the trade was reported late. The independent va-
riables include firm and trade characteristics. We use the number of analysts following as a proxy 
for investor attention.
6 Trade characteristics include trade volume relative to the firm‘s market 
capitalization and the number of different insiders trading on the same day. We include three fur-
ther control variables, namely, Tobin's Q as a proxy for the valuation of the firm, the return on 
equity as a measure of operating profitability, and book leverage. We do not have a clear predic-
tion regarding the sign and significance of the coefficients.  
Many firms restrict insider trading by defining a blackout period during which trading is prohi-
bited. Typically, the blackout period is just prior to an earnings announcement. A common ar-
rangement is to only allow trading within a short period after an earnings announcement (Bettis et 
al. (2000), Roulstone (2003)). We include in our model the dummy variable "pre-announcement", 
which is set to one if a trade was not executed within a 30-calendar-day window after an earnings 
announcement, and zero otherwise.
7  
                                                 
6  To avoid multicollinearity (the correlation between firm size and the number of analysts following is 0.79 in the 
transaction sample), we do not include firm size. We obtain very similar results, however, when we replace the 
number of analysts by firm size.  
7  Two comments are in place. First, Bettis et al. (2000)  survey 663 firms and report that the most common restric-
tion is to only allow insiders to trade within a short window (e.g. days 3 to 12) after an ear nings announcement. 
Roulstone (2003) analyzes a large sample of insider trades. From the observed trading pattern he deducts whether 
a firm has a restriction in place. Specifically, he assumes that a firm has a restriction in place when more than 75% 
of the insider trades occur in the 20 trading days (approximately one month) after earnings announcements are 
made. Since our sample is closer to Roulstone's than to the sample of firms surveyed by Bettis et al. (2000) we 
adopt a one month period. Second, data on earnings announcement dates are missing in some cases. We deal with 
this by excluding all observations where the time between the insider trade and the date of the publication of the 
next quarterly earnings announcement is more than 91 days. We obtain similar results when we include all obser-  16 
We further define three dummy variables that describe the insider‘s position in the firm. The first 
dummy is set to one when the CEO is among the traders trading on a given day, and zero other-
wise. The second dummy identifies trades by the chairman of the board (unless the chairman is 
simultaneously the CEO) and the third one identifies trades by other executive directors of the 
firm. Trades by outside directors, beneficial owners, and others thus constitute the base group. 
We estimate a pooled model that includes both purchases and sales and two separate models in-
cluding only purchases and sales, respectively. The pooled model includes a dummy variable that 
captures differences in the probability of late reporting between purchases and sales. All models 
include sector dummies (where we adopt the classification used in the TFN insider filings) and 
year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Table IV reports marginal effects 
(the change in the probability of late filing for a unit change in the explanatory variable, evaluated 
at the mean values of the explanatory variables) and the respective z-statistics.  
The probability of late filings is generally higher for purchases than for sales. This result is con-
sistent with the earlier finding that average reporting delays are longer for purchases than for 
sales. Trades by insiders in firms followed by more analysts are less likely to be filed late. This is 
an intuitive finding, given that these firms tend to be larger and are under closer scrutiny by ana-
                                                                                                                                                              
vations. In the latter case we misclassify those insider trades that were executed within a 30-day window after the 
publication date of an earnings announcement not included in our data set.    17 
lysts and investors in general. We further find that sales by insiders in more highly leveraged 
firms are more likely to be reported late. No such relation is found for insider purchases.  
Insert Table IV about here 
Considering trade-specific variables next, we find that trades executed during the period prior to 
earnings announcements are significantly more likely to be reported late. There are two not mu-
tually exclusive explanations for this finding. First, insiders are more likely to possess relevant 
private information prior to an earnings announcement and therefore have an incentive to strateg-
ically delay the reporting of their trades. Second, as noted above, many firms have adopted poli-
cies that allow insider trades only in a window which is open for a specified period after the quar-
terly earnings announcement (Bettis et al. (2000)). Insiders in these firms are more likely to trade 
shortly after an earnings announcement and, at the same time, are more likely to be scrutinized 
and may therefore tend to file their reports in time.  
The other two trade-specific variables, trade size and the number of insiders trading on a given 
day, do not yield significant results. With respect to the position of the insider within the firm, we 
find that CEOs, chairmen of the board, and executive directors are significantly less likely to file 
late than other corporate insiders (such as, e.g., non-executive directors and beneficial owners). 
This finding is again consistent with the notion that insiders who are under closer scrutiny are 
more reluctant to file their reports late.   18 
In summary, our results are consistent with the notion that the occurrence of late filings is not 
random. In particular, it appears that insiders who are more closely monitored (and who therefore 
may be facing higher litigation risk) are less likely to file their trades late. 
III.  Incidences of Strategic Trading and Strategic Trade Reporting 
So far, we have documented that considerable reporting delays exist and that the reporting re-
quirement is violated in more than 13% of cases. Delayed reporting per se may be detrimental to 
market efficiency, but it does not necessarily benefit the insider. An insider who only wants to 
execute a single trade has no incentive (beyond convenience) to delay the filing. This is different, 
however, when the insider intends to trade more than once. In this case, delaying the reporting of 
earlier trades avoids the price reaction the report would trigger. Thus, later trades are executed at 
prices that are more favorable than those that would have prevailed had each trade been reported 
immediately. Note that this is true irrespective of whether the insider trades on private informa-
tion or not. It is sufficient that other market participants believe the insider to be informed with 
positive probability. 
In this section we search for evidence of strategic trade reporting. We classify a trade as nonstra-
tegic if it is a) not preceded by another trade that has not been reported until the trading date and   19 
b) is not followed by another trade before it is reported.
8 All other trades are classified as strategic 
because they are part of a series of trades in which some trades were executed while other trades 
were not yet reported. Figure 3 demonstrates two cases. Trades 1 and 2 in panel A of Figure 3 are 
executed on different days but reported jointly. According to the definition above, both trades are 
classified as strategic. Because they are reported jointly, market participants can infer that the 
trades are strategic. Panel B of Figure 3 shows a different situation, where trades 1 and 2 are ex-
ecuted on different days as well as reported on different days. Because trade 1 is reported after 
trade 2 is executed, both trades are strategic according to our definition. However, on the date on 
which trade 1 is reported, market participants cannot infer that trade 1 is strategic. Upon trade 2 
being reported, however, it becomes apparent that both trades are strategic. When we analyze the 
market response to strategic trades in the next section, we adjust our definition of strategic trades 
accordingly. A trade will be considered strategic only when market participants can infer it was a 
strategic trade. Consequently, trade 1 in Panel B  of Figure 3 will be classified as nonstrategic 
when we analyze the abnormal returns after the filing of insider trades in Section IV. In the cur-
rent section, however, we stick with our original definition because we take the point of view of 
the insider. 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
                                                 
8  We use an alternative definition as a robustness check. We only consider trades in the same direction (i.e., only 
purchases or only sales) and consider a series to be terminated when no further trades took place for at least 40 
days (the maximum reporting delay). This definition, which is similar to that used in Lebedeva et al. (2009) to 
identify stealth trading, yields the same conclusions.    20 
We note that our classification is conservative. The group of strategic trades does not only contain 
trades that were deliberately reported late. As noted previously, it is likely that some corporate 
insiders routinely report their trades on the 10th of the following month. If an insider adhering to 
this reporting practice trades several times in a month, our classification scheme will treat these 
trades as strategic.
9 There are two reasons why we stick to our classification. First, we cannot 
distinguish why we observe a specific pattern of trades and reports. Second, even if an insider 
does not intentionally delay the reporting of the earlier trades of a series, the delayed report still 
puts the counterparties to the later trades at a disadvantage, since they would have traded at more 
favorable prices had the insider reported all trades immediately. 
The results of a descriptive analysis are reported in Table V. Only 32.1% of the trades in our 
sample are categorized as nonstrategic.
10 This percentage is larger for purchases than for sales 
(38.0% versus 29.4%, respectively). This finding is surprising at first, since purchases are known 
to have larger price impacts (which should increase the incentive to strategically delay the report-
ing of a trade). Furthermore, we documented earlier that average reporting delays are larger for 
purchases. A potential explanation for the result is the difference in trade size.  Table V reveals 
that insider sales are, on average, much larger than insider purchases. The large size s of sell or-
                                                 
9  Our results are also conservative in a second sense. We only classify a trade as strategic when the same insider 
trades several times before reporting the trade. Besides these cases there are a large number of cases in which in-
siders trade while the SEC filing of another insider is still pending. This sequence also puts the counterparties to 
the later insider trades at a disadvantage because they would have traded at more favorable prices had the insider 
who traded first reported her trades immediately.    21 
ders provide an incentive to split up trades and report individual trades only after all the trades of 
a sequence have been executed. 
A total of 67.9% of the trades in our sample are classified as strategic. Each strategic trade is part 
of a sequence of trades. The end of a sequence is reached when there are no more unreported 
trades. Table V reveals that 15.0% of the trades are classified as the first trade of a sequence, 
while 52.9% are classified as second or subsequent trades of a sequence. These numbers imply 
that a sequence, on average, consists of 4.5 trades. This number is higher for purchases than for 
sales (4.9, compared to 4.4, respectively). 
Insert Table V about here 
Table V documents that strategic trade reporting is widely practiced. We therefore now analyze 
whether strategic trades are systematically different from nonstrategic trades. To this end we es-
timate logit models where the dependent variable indicates whether a trade is classified as strateg-
ic or nonstrategic. The independent variables are the trade, firm, and trader characteristics intro-
duced in the previous section. We add a dummy variable that identifies trades that were filed 
                                                                                                                                                              
10  As one might expect, the percentage of non-strategic trades is lower in the subsample of trades that are filed late. 
Only 22% of these trades are classified as non-strategic.    22 
late.
11 We estimate a pooled model as well as separate models for pu rchases and sales. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level.  
The results (marginal effects and z-statistics) are reported in Table VI. Purchases are less likely 
than sales to be classified as strategic, which is consistent with the descriptive results presented 
above and may be related to the fact that insider purchases on average are much smaller than in-
sider sales. The likelihood of observing strategic trades is  lower in firms followed by more ana-
lysts. This finding is intuitive because insiders in these firms are  more closely monitored. We 
further find the likelihood for strategic trades to be increased in firms with lower returns on equi-
ty. Insider sales in firms with higher Q and in less leveraged firms are more likely to be classified 
as strategic whereas no such relation is found for insider purchases.  
Insert Table VI about here 
Turning to the trade-specific variables next, we find that larger trades are less likely to be classi-
fied as strategic trades. This finding is consistent with the conjecture that strategic trades are the 
result of large orders that have been split up into smaller chunks. We also find that trades that are 
filed late are more likely to be classified as strategic. The dummy variable identifying trades ex-
ecuted in the period prior to the publication of an earnings announcement is positive and signifi-
cant for insider purchases, but insignificant for sales. Interestingly, the chairman of the board is 
                                                 
11  We obtain similar results when we replace the "late reporting" dummy by the reporting delay measured in days. 
We prefer the specification that includes the dummy because it is more robust in the presence of outliers (i.e.,   23 
more likely to engage in strategic trading, whereas executive directors (excluding the CEO) are 
less likely to engage in strategic trading than the members of the base group (non-executive direc-
tors, beneficial owners, and others). The results for the CEO are somewhat less clear, with an 
(insignificant) negative coefficient for purchases and a (significant) positive coefficient for sales. 
Our results lend support to the hypothesis that insiders strategically time their trades and made 
strategic use of pre-SOX reporting rules. The next section addresses whether market reactions to 
the reporting of insider trades take that into account. 
 
IV.  Market Response to Strategic Trades 
This section analyzes share price reactions after the reporting of insider trades using standard 
event study methodology. This analysis serves a dual purpose. First, we want to test our conjec-
ture that delayed reporting is detrimental to market efficiency. To this end, we analyze whether 
reporting day CARs decrease with the length of the reporting delay and, if so, how quickly. A 
finding that CARs decrease quickly with the length of the delay would provide evidence that the 
market is able to learn the information contained in the insider trade from other sources and thus 
does not have to rely on the report. If, on the other hand, we find that the CAR decreases slowly, 
or not at all, with the length of the delay, this could be interpreted as evidence that market prices 
                                                                                                                                                              
trades reported with extremely long delays).    24 
are indeed distorted in the period between the trading and reporting dates. This, in turn, would 
imply that delayed reporting hampers market efficiency. Second, we wish to analyze whether the 
CARs are larger after the reporting of strategic trades. The result will allow us to draw conclu-
sions about the market‘s belief about insider trading motives. If the market reaction after strategic 
trades is stronger than after otherwise similar nonstrategic trades, this would provide evidence 
that the market attributes higher information content to these trades. 
As already noted above, we use standard event study methodology. The event date is defined to 
be the day on which an insider trade is filed with the SEC. The analysis is based on the event 
study sample introduced in Section I. This sample is obtained by aggregating all insider trades in 
shares of the same firm that were reported on the same day. We must aggregate reports filed by 
different insiders because otherwise we would double-count observations. We estimate the mar-
ket model over a 255-day estimation window ending 46 days
12 prior to the announcement date. 
We use the CRSP value-weighted index as our market proxy, and T-statistics are based on the 
standardized cross-sectional test proposed by Boehmer et al. (1991). 
The event study results are reported in  Table VII. We report CARs over  four event windows, 
namely, (0; 1), (0; 2), (0; 10), and (0; 20), and we report separate results for insider purchases and 
insider sales. Consistent with previous research, we find that CARs over a short event window 
                                                 
12  We choose a longer delay between the end of the estimation window and the event window because we do not 
want the estimation window to be contaminated by the execution of the insider trade. Note that 46 days is slightly 
more than the maximum delay for reporting admissible in the pre-SOX era.    25 
are small. The CARs over the two-day window (0; 1) amount to 0.29% for purchases and -0.21% 
for sales. The CARs increase significantly when the lengths of the event window are increased. 
The CARs over the event window (0; 10) are 1.99% for purchases and -0.87% for sales; the cor-
responding values for the  21-day event  window (0; 20) are  2.97% and -2.05%, respectively. 
These results confirm previous findings that the share price reaction is stronger after insider pur-
chases than after insider sales. 
Insert Table VII about here 
We next compare the CARs after strategic and nonstrategic trades. As noted previously, we only 
categorize a trade as strategic when, on the filing date, market participants can infer that the trade 
was strategic. The results provide clear evidence that market participants attribute higher informa-
tion content to strategic trades. The share price reaction after these trades is stronger than that 
after nonstrategic trades, irrespective of whether we consider purchases or sales or the length of 
the event window. Consider the CAR over the 20-day window (0; 20) as an example: It is 3.75% 
after strategic purchases but only 2.45% after nonstrategic purchases. The corresponding figures 
for strategic and nonstrategic sales are -2.55% and -1.49%, respectively. The difference between 
the price reactions after strategic and nonstrategic trades is  (based on a t-test for equality of 
means) statistically significant in all cases. 
Table VII also reports the results of further cross-tabulations. As noted previously, many firms 
restrict insider trading by defining a blackout period during which trading is prohibited. Typical-  26 
ly, the blackout period is the period just prior to an earnings announcement (often two months; 
see Bettis et al. (2000) and Roulstone (2003)). Such a restriction is based on the assumption that 
the informational asymmetry between corporate insiders and other market participants is larger 
prior to earnings announcements. If this assumption is true, we should observe larger CARs after 
trades that non-restricted insiders execute prior to earnings announcements. To test this hypothe-
sis, we define the dummy variable "pre-announcement" as set to one if at least one of the trades 
reported on a given day was executed within a 60-day window prior to an earnings announce-
ment. We find that purchases made during the pre-announcement period result in significantly 
larger share price reactions. This finding is consistent with the notion that earnings announce-
ments reduce informational asymmetries. For insider sales, there are no significant differences 
between trades executed during the pre-announcement period and other trades. 
We next consider the timing of trades relative to earnings announcement dates. We look at trades 
that were executed in the period before an earnings announcement but reported after the an-
nouncement. To this end we define the dummy variable "timed", which is set to one if all trades 
reported on a given day  were executed before and reported after the earnings announcement 
date.
13 We find that timed trades convey significantly less information to the market. Considering 
again the (0; 20) event window as an example, we find a CAR of 3.22% for non-timed purchases 
                                                 
13  We used an alternative definition as a robustness check. Specifically, we only considered trades as "timed" if they 
were executed prior to but reported after the earnings announcement, but prior to the next announcement. This 
excludes trades that were reported with very long delays. Both the results of the cross-tabulations and the results   27 
and a CAR of only 1.87% for timed purchases. The corresponding figures for sales are -2.19% 
and -1.21%, respectively. These results are again consistent with the notion that earnings an-
nouncements reduce the informational asymmetry between insiders and the market. 
Next we compare trades that were reported in time with trades that were filed late. We define a 
dummy variable late filing that is set to one if all of the trades reported on a given day were filed 
late. The results are inconsistent. Over longer event windows (10 or 20 days), trades reported in 
time trigger stronger share price reactions (3.02% versus 2.69% for purchases and -2.06% versus 
-2.04% for sales). The difference is significant only for insider purchases, however. 
Trades that are filed late are, by definition, reported with longer delays. Thus, finding that insider 
purchases that are filed late trigger smaller share price reactions is consistent with the notion that 
the market learns some of the information contained in the report from other sources. To shed 
more light on this important issue, we next sort the insider trades in our sample into ten groups 
with respect to their weighted average reporting delays (delay 0–5 days, 5–10 days, and so on, 
with  trades in the 10th group having a weighted average delay of more than 45 days). We find 
that the CARs are significantly different from zero irrespective of the trading delay. They tend to 
slightly decrease with the length of the delay for purchases, but not for sales.
14 These results imp-
                                                                                                                                                              
of the cross-sectional regressions to be presented below are very similar when we use this alternative specifica-
tion.  
14  Brochet (2010) reports a similar result.    28 
ly that prices are distorted in the period between the execution and filing of an insider trade. Con-
sequently, delayed reporting is detrimental to market efficiency. 
The results in Table VII suggest that timed trades, that is, trades executed before but reported 
after an earnings announcement, and trades executed within a 30-day window after an earnings 
announcement trigger smaller share price reactions. The results also suggest that the CAR de-
creases with the length of the reporting delay for insider purchases but not for sales. However, up 
to now we did not control for the other firm and trade characteristics. Including such controls is 
important because we showed previously that trades that are filed late are systematically different 
from trades that are filed in time. Similarly, we showed that strategic trades are different from 
nonstrategic  trades.  In  addition,  reporting  strategic  trades  typically  involves  reporting  several 
trades on the same day,
15 and therefore the total reported volume is larger. It may be the larger 
volume rather than the strategic nature of the trade per se that causes the larger CARs. 
We therefore estimate cross-sectional regressions that control for the total reported volume and 
other potentially relevant variables. The dependent variable is the CAR. We report results for the 
CARs measured over the event window (0; 20). Using the shorter event window (0; 10) yields 
results that are qualitatively similar.  
                                                 
15  The typical case is illustrated in Panel A of Figure 3. Several trades are executed on different days but reported 
jointly. The case illustrated in Panel B of Figure 3, where strategic trades are reported individually, is much less 
common.    29 
The independent variables include measures of firm characteristics (Tobin's Q, return on equity, 
book leverage, and number of analysts following
16) and trade characteristics (transaction volume 
relative to the firm‘s market capitalization and aggregated over all trades that were reported joint-
ly, number of different insiders trading on the same day, and weighted average reporting delay
17). 
We further include dummy variables identifying strategic trades, trades executed in the period  
prior to an earnings announcement, and timed trades (i.e., those executed in the period prior to an 
earnings announcement and reported after the announcement, but prior to the next earnings an-
nouncement). We also include the interaction between the timed dummy and the  strategic dum-
my. Three further dummy variables control for the position of the insider in the firm (CEO, 
chairman of the board, other executive directors
18). Finally, we include year and industry dum-
mies. 
We estimate separate models for purchases and sales. Note that we expect different signs for the 
coefficients in the two regressions, because the CARs after purchases are predominantly positive 
                                                 
16  To avoid multicollinearity (the correlation between firm size and the number of analysts following is 0.80 in our 
event study sample), we do not include firm size. When we replace the number of analysts with firm size, we ob-
tain very similar results. We also estimated versions of our models which include additional firm characteristics (a 
measure of asset tangibility as defined in Almeida and Campello 2007 and the standard deviations of returns in 
the 60 days prior to the event date). Tangibility turned out to be insignificant, return volatility was positive and 
significant for purchases but not for sales.  
17  One potential problem with the delay variable lies in the fact that there are obvious outliers in the sample, as is 
evidenced by a maximum reporting delay in excess of 10 years. We deal with this issue by estimating three alter-
native versions of the model. We use a) a delay variable that is winsorized at 42 (the maximum delay allowed in 
the pre-SOX era), b) the log of 1 plus the delay, and c) a dummy variable that identifies trades that were filed late. 
These alternative specifications yield similar results. We therefore report results only for the base model.    30 
while those after sales are predominantly negative. We include firm fixed effects. Standard errors 
are clustered at the reporting-day level. The results are shown in Table VIII. The CARs after in-
sider purchases are smaller for firms with higher values of Tobin‘s Q and for firms with more 
analysts following. The other firm characteristics are insignificant. The share price reaction after a 
purchase does not depend on the transaction volume. It is larger when more than one insider re-
ported trades on the same day. Consistent with our earlier results, we find that purchases executed 
during the period prior to an earnings announcement trigger significantly larger price reactions. 
Timed purchases—those that are executed before but reported after an earnings announcement—
trigger significantly smaller share price reactions than other purchases. These results are consis-
tent with the notion that earnings announcements convey information to the market and reduce 
informational asymmetries. Purchases by the CEO, the chairman of the board, and other execu-
tive directors result in higher CARs than purchases by members of the base group (non-executive 
directors, affiliates, beneficial owners, and others). This result in general and the relative sizes of 
the coefficients in particular are consistent with the informational hierarchy hypothesis, which 
posits that trades by insiders with more privileged access to information convey more information 
to the market. 
Insert Table VIII about here 
                                                                                                                                                              
18  If several insiders report their trades on the same day, we choose the highest insider position; that is, we set the 
dummy to one if at least one of the insiders is the CEO, the chairman of the board, or an executive director, and 
zero otherwise.    31 
The most important results are those with respect to the strategic trading dummy and the report-
ing delay. Strategic purchases trigger a significantly larger share price reaction, even after control-
ling for other relevant variables. Note that, on the reporting day (our event day), market partici-
pants observe whether a report contains strategic trades. Our results thus imply that market partic-
ipants believe that strategic purchases are more likely to be motivated by private information than 
otherwise similar nonstrategic trades.
19 The additional abnormal return is 0.9%, which is also 
economically significant. The coefficient on the reporting delay is insignificant, indicating that 
CARs do not decrease when a trade is reported with a longer delay.  Thus, once we control for 
trade and firm characteristics, the negative relation reported in Table VII disappears. This result 
supports our conjecture that delayed reporting is detrimental to market efficiency. 
The results for insider sales differ from those for purchases in several respects. Trades by insiders 
in more highly valued firms (larger Q)  trigger stronger (more negative) price reactions, as do 
trades by insiders in firms followed by more analysts. Price reactions after insider sales filings are 
stronger when more than one insider reports a trade on the same day.  Trade size, on the other 
hand, does not have a systematic impact.  Trades by CEOs and other executive directors  cause 
stronger price reactions. The insignificant coefficients on the  pre-announcement  and timing 
                                                 
19  As noted earlier many insiders routinely file their reports on the 10th of the month following the trades. It is con-
ceivable that these routine reports are less informative than reports filed on other days. Therefore, we re-estimated 
the regression with two additional dummy variables. The first identifies reports filed on the 10th of a month, the 
second one interacts this dummy with the dummy identifying strategic trades. We find that indeed reports filed on 
the 10th of a month trigger smaller CARs. However, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and signifi-  32 
dummies indicate that the timing of the trade itself and of the report relative to earnings an-
nouncements do not significantly affect the abnormal returns. 
The coefficient for the reporting delay is significantly positive, though small in magnitude. Thus, 
the CARs after insider sales tend to decrease when a trade is reported with a longer delay. The 
decrease is slow, however. Therefore, the conclusion that delayed reporting is detrimental to mar-
ket efficiency is still valid. 
Strategic sales apparently convey more information to the market than nonstrategic trades, as is 
evidenced  by  the  significantly  negative  coefficient  on the strategic trade dummy.
20 We note, 
though, that the absolute magnitude of the coefficient is smaller than that of the corresponding 
coefficient in the regression for insider purcha ses. This, together with our finding s that CARs 
after insider sales are generally smaller and that the timing of the trade and the report does not 
affect the magnitude of the price reaction, is consistent with the view that insider sales are gener-
ally less likely to be motivated by private information than insider purchases. 
                                                                                                                                                              
cant. Thus, the result that strategic trades trigger larger abnormal returns also holds for those reports filed on the 
10th of a month.  
20  When we re-estimate the regression including a dummy that identifies trades reported on the 10th of a month and 
an interaction between this dummy and the "strategic" dummy, none of the coefficient estimates is significant.    33 
V.  Summary and Conclusions 
In the pre-SOX era corporate insiders in the US were required to report their trades by the 10th of 
the month following the trade. Thus, the maximum time allowed between the trade and the report 
was 40 days, giving corporate insiders considerable flexibility to time their trades and reports. 
This flexibility may be used strategically. An insider wishing to trade a large quantity may split 
up an order into several smaller chunks. Splitting up a large order reduces its price impact and 
thus results in reduced execution costs. By delaying the reporting of the trades of a series until 
after the last transaction, an insider can avoid the price impact caused by the reports. 
This paper asks four related questions. First, how long are the reporting delays in the pre-SOX 
era? Second, do insiders strategically use their flexibility in choosing the timing of their trades 
and reports? If so, is strategic behavior systematically related to the characteristics of the insider 
or the firm? Third, what are the implications of delayed reporting on market efficiency? Fourth, 
how does the market react to the strategic timing of trades and reports? 
Our results demonstrate that substantial reporting delays existed. The mean reporting delay was 
35 days. More than 13% of the trades in our sample were filed late (i.e., later than on the 10th of 
the month following the trade). The very large number of violations of the trade reporting re-
quirement implies that the requirement was not enforced in the pre-SOX era. Corporate insiders 
apparently used their discretion to time their reports. More than two-thirds of the trades in our 
sample are part of a sequence of trades in which some trades were executed while earlier trades   34 
were not yet reported. Strategic trade reporting benefits the insider but is disadvantageous to the 
counterparties to the insider‘s trades. If each trade were reported immediately, the second and 
subsequent trades of a series of insider trades would be executed at prices less favorable to the 
insider but more favorable to the counterparties. 
We find that both the occurrence of late filings and the occurrence of strategic trades are syste-
matically related to the characteristics of the firm, the trade, and the trader. In particular, our re-
sults are consistent with the notion that insiders who are more closely monitored (and who there-
fore may be facing higher litigation risk) are less likely to file their trades late. The probability of 
observing a strategic trade is larger in firms followed by fewer analysts as well as for larger 
trades. 
Our event study results reveal that share prices react to the reporting of insider trades. In cross-
sectional regressions, we find that the magnitude of the price reaction does not decrease with the 
reporting delay after purchases, and decreases slowly after sales. Thus, our results support the 
notion that market prices are distorted in the period between the trade and the report. Consequent-
ly, the delayed reporting of insider trades is detrimental to market efficiency. Finally, event study 
CARs are larger after reports of strategic insider trades compared to after otherwise similar non-
strategic trades for both purchases and sales. Thus, market participants apparently believe that 
insiders acting strategically are more likely to possess private information.   35 
Our results support the more stringent trade reporting requirements established by SOX. They 
also suggest that the strict enforcement of existing regulations is beneficial. Furthermore, our re-
sults lead to the conclusion that countries that currently allow for long reporting delays (or do not 
require corporate insiders to report trades in the shares of their firm) should consider tightening 
their regulations.   36 
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Table I: Description of variables. 
Variable  Definition 
Pre-ann.  A trade that occurs during the period of less than 60 days prior to the next earnings 
announcement. 
CAR  Cumulative abnormal return calculated using the market model over a 255-day esti-
mation window ending 46 days prior to the announcement date. The market proxy is 
the CRSP value-weighted index. 
D_pre-ann.  Pre-announcement dummy: Dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the 
trade occurs during the period of less than 60 days prior to the next earnings an-
nouncement, and zero otherwise. 
For the cross-sectional regression of CARs, if several trades are reported on the same 
day, the dummy takes on the value of one if at least one trade occurs during the pe-
riod of less than 60 days prior to the next earnings announcement, and zero other-
wise. 
D_CEO  Dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the trader is a CEO, and zero oth-
erwise. 
For the cross-sectional regression of CARs, if there are several trades in the same 
stock on the same day, the highest insider position is selected, according to the rank-
ing CEO, chairman, executive, and other. 
D_chairman  Dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the trader is the chairman but not 
the CEO, and zero otherwise. 
For the cross-sectional regression of CARs, if there are several trades in the same 
stock on the same day, the highest insider position is selected according to the rank-
ing CEO, chairman, executive, and other. 
D_executive  Dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the trader is an executive director 
but not the CEO, and zero otherwise. 
For the cross-sectional regression of CARs, if there are several trades in the same 
stock on the same day, the highest insider position is selected according to the rank-
ing CEO, chairman, executive, and other. 
D_late  Dummy variable that takes on the value of one if it was reported later than the 10th of 
the month following the trade, and zero otherwise. If the 10th of the month falls on a 
weekend, the trade is classified as illegal if it was reported later than the following 
Monday. 
D_other  Dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the trader is a non-executive officer, 
affiliate, beneficial owners, or other person required to report trades, and zero other-
wise. 
For the cross-sectional regression of CARs, if there are several trades in the same 
stock on the same day, the highest insider position is selected according to the rank-
ing CEO, chairman, executive, and other. 
D_purchase  Dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the (net) transaction volume of the   40 
insider trade is positive, and zero otherwise. 
D_strategic  For the cross-sectional regression of CARs, the dummy variable takes on the value of 
one if a) the trade is followed by at least one additional trade by the same insider 
before it is reported or it follows a trade by the same insider that has not yet been 
reported, and b) the market can infer on the reporting date that the trade was strategic 
(see Figure 3 for an illustration). All other trades are classified as nonstrategic and 
the dummy variable is zero for these cases. With respect to strategic trades that are 
reported in an overlapping way, only serial transactions and not just the first one can 
be identified as strategic. 
D_timing  Dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the trade is executed within 60 days 
prior to the next earnings announcement and is reported after the announcement (but 
before the following announcement), and zero otherwise. 
D_timing * D_stra  Interaction term of the variables D_timing and D_strategic. 
Days to next report  Number of days from the transaction to the next quarterly earnings announcement. 
Delay  Lag in days between trading and reporting the transaction. 
For descriptive statistics and the cross-sectional regression of CARs, Delay is the 
trading-volume–weighted average delay of all insider trades of a firm reported on the 
same day. 
Filed in time  Refers to a trade reported before the 10th of the month following the trade or by the 
next Monday if the 10th falls on a weekend.  
Filed late  Refers to a trade reported after the 10th of the month following the trade. If the 10th 
of the month falls on a weekend, the trade is classified as illegal if it reported later 
than the following Monday. 
First of series  A trade that is the first in a series of trades where at least one trade is followed by at 
least one additional trade by the same insider before being reported. 
Leverage  Ratio of long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities divided by long-term debt plus 
debt in current liabilities plus stockholder equity. 
Market  value  of  equity 
($ millions) 
Share price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. 
Non pre-ann.  Refers to a trade that does not occur during the period of less than 60 days prior to 
the next earnings announcement.  
Nonstrategic  Refers to a trade that is not followed by at least one additional trade by the same 
insider before being reported or that does not follow a trade by the same insider that 
has not yet been reported.  
Non-timed  Refers to a trade that is either (a) not executed within the 60 days prior to the next 
earnings announcement, (b) reported by the next earnings announcement, or (c) re-
ported after the earnings announcement that follows the next earnings announcement. 
Numest  Total number of analysts covering a company in the month before the reporting date 
of the insider trade. 
NumInsider  Total number of insiders who traded shares in the same company on the same day.   41 
For the cross-sectional regression of CARs, this refers to the total number of insiders 
who reported trades in shares of the same company on the same day. 
RoE  Return on equity, defined as net income divided by book equity. 
Serial trade  A trade that follows another one by the same insider that has not yet been reported. 
Strategic  Refers to a trade that is followed by at least one additional trade by the same insider 
before being reported or that follows a trade by the same insider that has not yet been 
reported. 
For descriptive statistics of CARs, a) the trade is followed by at least one additional 
trade by the same insider before it is reported or it follows a trade by the same insider 
that has not yet been reported, and b) the market can infer on the reporting date that 
the trade was strategic (see Figure 3 for an illustration). All other trades are classified 
as nonstrategic. With respect to strategic trades that are reported in an overlapping 
way, only serial transactions and not just the first one can be identified as strategic. 
Timed  Refers  to  a  trade  that  is  executed  within  60  days  prior  to  the  next  earnings  an-
nouncement  and  reported  after  the  announcement  (but  before  the  following  an-
nouncement). 
Tobin‘s Q  Ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of total assets. 
TradeVolume  The number of shares exchanged in a transaction times the transaction price divided 
by the market equity of the company whose stocks were bought or sold in the insider 
trade. 
For the cross-sectional regression of CARs, if several trades were reported on the 
same day, we sum the total volume of those trades. 
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Table II: Descriptive statistics. 
This table reports the summary statistics for the transaction sample. Tobin‘s Q is calculated as the ratio of the market 
value of assets to the book value of total assets. The variable RoE is net income divided by book equity. We measure 
leverage as the ratio of long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities to long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities 
plus stockholder equity. We define the variable Numest as the total number of analysts covering a company in the 
month before the reporting date of an insider trade. We calculate the variable TradeVolume as the number of shares 
exchanged in a transaction times the transaction price to the market equity of the company whose stocks were bought 
or sold in the insider trade. We define NumInsider as the total number of insiders who traded their shares in the same 
company on the same day. Days to next report denotes the number of days from a transaction to the next quarterly 
earnings announcement. Delay indicates the lag in days between the trading and reporting of a transaction. 
 
Variables  Observations  Mean  St. dev.  Min  Median  Max 
Market value of equity ($ mil-
lions) 
314,696  4544.39  21599.05  0.83  463.779  508329.5 
Tobin‘s Q  314,696  3.518829  6.176608  .2060  1.809387  105.0904 
RoE  314,696  .0890093   .2683587  -.80291    .0970181  9.886905 
Leverage  314,696  .3142774  .5807833  0  .2453287  69.17618 
TradeVolume  314,696  .00121  .0059537  0  .000221  .5794915 
NumInsider  314,696  2.037859  2.120972  0  1  32 
Days to next report  314,696  57.00452  23.36936  0  62  91 
Numest  314,696  7.568774  7.434395  1  5  51 
Delay (days)  314,696  34.99665  95.14544  0  24  3,815 
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Table III: Distribution of delays. 
This table reports summary statistics for the distribution of the reporting delays. 
 
  All  Purchases  Sales   
Observations  314,696  98,933  215,763   
Mean  35.00  40.42  32.51   
St. dev.  95.15  114.54  84.66   
0.25 quantile  15  14  16   
Median  24  24  24   
0.75 quantile  33  34  33   
Percentage of late filings  13.21%  17.48%  11.25%   
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Table IV: Determinants of late filing. 
This table reports the results of a logit regression of the dichotomized variable filed late on the explanatory variables 
listed in the first column. A trade is classified as having been filed late when it was reported later than the 10th of the 
month following the trade. If the 10th of the month falls on a weekend, the trade is classified as having been filed late 
when it was reported later than the following Monday. D_purchase is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one 
if the (net) transaction volume of the respective insider trade is positive, and zero otherwise. Tobin‘s Q is calculated 
as the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of total assets. RoE is net income divided by book equity. 
We measure leverage as the ratio of long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities to long-term debt plus debt in cur-
rent liabilities plus stockholder equity. We define Numest as the total number of analysts covering a company in the 
month before the reporting date of the insider trade. We calculate TradeVolume as the number of shares exchanged 
in the transaction times the transaction price divided by the market equity of the company whose stocks were bought 
or sold in the insider trade. We define NumInsider as the total number of insiders who traded their shares in the same 
company on the same day. D_pre-ann. is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the trade occurs during 
the period of less than 60 days prior to the next earnings announcement. We classified all insiders into four groups 
(four variables): D_CEO if the trader was the CEO, D_chairman if the trader was the chairman but not the CEO, 
D_executive if the trader was an executive director but not the CEO, and the reference group D_other, which in-
cludes all other insiders. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. dy/dx denotes the change in probability for a 
unit change in the explanatory variable evaluated at the average value of the explanatory variable. With respect to 
dummy variables, dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Here *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
  All  Purchases  Sales 
Independent 
variables 
dy/dx  z-Statistic  dy/dx  z-Statistic  dy/dx.  z-Statistic 
D_purchase  0.0310     5.44***         
Tobin‘s Q  0.0001     0.12  0.0013  0.94  -0.0001  -0.13 
RoE  -0.0001     -0.53  -0.0004  -1.31  0.0000  -0.12 
Leverage  0.0065     1.15  0.0032  0.85  0.0100  2.85*** 
Numest  -0.0046     -11.17***  -0.0059  -6.77***  -0.0040  -9.69*** 
TradeVolume  -0.1150     -0.56  0.5173  0.84  -0.1749  -0.92 
NumInsider  0.0002     0.09  0.0012  0.41  -0.0007  -0.35 
D_pre-ann.  0.0266     8.62***  0.0351  5.31***  0.0220  6.81*** 
D_CEO  -0.0487     -12.23***  -0.0737  -8.41***  -0.0373  -8.9*** 
D_chairman  -0.0404     -6.15***  -0.0585  -4.6***  -0.0332  -4.55*** 
D_executive  -0.0472     -11.6***   -0.0566  -6.18***  -0.0420  -10.27*** 
Predicted prob.  0.1206    0.1642    0.1038   
Year dummies  Included  Included  Included 
Industry  dum-
mies 
Included  Included  Included 
Observations  314,696  98,933  215,763 
McFadden R²  3.93%  3.45%  3.18%   45 
Table V: Descriptive statistics of strategic trades. 
This table shows the descriptive statistics for the transactions in our sample sorted by classifying trades into nonstrategic and strategic categories. A trade is classified as 
strategic when it is followed by at least one additional trade by the same insider before it is reported or if it follows a trade by the same insider that has not yet been re-
ported, and nonstrategic otherwise. The strategic category is split into first of series and serial trades. A trade is classified as first of series if the trade is the first trade in a 
series of trades where at least one trade is followed by at least one additional trade by the same insider before it is reported. A trade is classified as a serial trade if it fol-
lows a trade by the same insider that has not yet been reported. Percentages indicate fractions with respect to all transactions, all purchases or all sales, respectively. Av-
erage volume denotes the average volume of the trade, that is, the number of shares bought or sold multiplied by the transaction price. 
 
  All  Purchases  Sales 
Observations  314,696  140,734  215,763 
  Percentage  Average volume $  Percentage  Average volume $  Percentage  Average volume $ 
Nonstrategic  32.12%  1,291,563  37.97%  197,628  29.44%  1,938,516 
Strategic  67.88%  1,015,069  62.03%  284,504  70.56%  1,309,553 
    First of series  14.98%  1,389,175  12.59%  213,350  16.08%  1,811,510 
    Serial trades  52.90%  909,106  49.44%  302,631  54.48%  1,161,429 
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Table VI: Determinants of strategic trades. 
This table reports the results of a logit regression of the dichotomized variable strategic on the explanatory variables 
listed in the first column. A trade is classified as strategic when it is followed by at least one additional trade by the 
same insider before it is reported or if it follows a trade by the same insider that has not yet been reported, and non-
strategic otherwise. D_purchase is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the transaction is a purchase, 
and zero if the transaction is a sale. Tobin‘s Q is calculated as the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value 
of total assets. RoE is net income divided by book equity. We measure leverage as the ratio of long-term debt plus 
debt in current liabilities to long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities plus stockholder equity. We define Numest 
as the total number of analysts covering a company in the month before the reporting date of the insider trade. Tra-
deVolume is the number of shares exchanged in the transaction times the transaction price divided by the market 
equity of the company whose stocks were bought or sold in the insider trade. We define NumInsider as the total num-
ber of insiders who traded their shares in the same company on the same day. D_pre-ann. is a dummy variable that 
takes on the value of one if the trade occurs within 60 days prior to the next quarterly earnings announcement. D_late 
is a dummy that takes on the value of one if the trade is reported later than the 10th of the month following the trade. 
If the 10th of the month falls on a weekend, the trade is classified as illegal if it was reported later than the following 
Monday. We classified all insiders into four groups (four variables): D_CEO if the trader was the CEO, D_chairman 
if the trader was the chairman but not the CEO, D_executive if the trader was an executive director but not the CEO, 
and the reference group D_other, which includes all other insider groups. Standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level. dy/dx denotes the change in probability for a unit change in the explanatory variable evaluated at the average 
value of the explanatory variable. With respect to dummy variables, dy/dx is for a discrete change of dummy variable 
from 0 to 1. Here *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
  All  Purchases  Sales 
Independent  
variables 
dy/dx  z-Statistic  dy/dx  z-Statistic  dy/dx  z-Statistic 
D_purchase  -0.1381  -17.68***         
Tobin‘s Q  0.0066  7.37***  -0.0018  -0.7  0.0066  7.39*** 
RoE  -0.0009  -2.68***  -0.0013  -1.69*  -0.0007  -2.86*** 
Leverage  0.0023  0.8  0.0258  1.11  -0.0063  -1.73* 
Numest  -0.0075  -14.5***  -0.0128  -12.06***  -0.0064  -11.95*** 
TradeVolume  -4.5124  -8.91***  -1.3043  -1.33  -4.5983  -8.92*** 
NumInsider  0.0030  1.05  0.0027  0.53  0.0017  0.58 
D_pre-ann.  0.0081  2.21**  0.0256  3.92***  -0.0009  -0.21 
D_late  0.1064  18.7***  0.1401  13.9***  0.0843  15.3*** 
D_CEO  0.0184  2.19**  -0.0193  -1.34  0.0393  4.18*** 
D_chairman  0.0778  5.81***  0.0415  1.67*  0.0886  5.8*** 
D_executive  -0.1852  -27.76***  -0.2460  -22.53***  -0.1561  -19.94*** 
PredictedProb.  0.6980    0.6316    0.7269   
Year dummies  Included  Included  Included 
Industry  dum-
mies 
Included  Included  Included 
Observations  314,696  98,933  215,763 
McFadden R²  8.05%  8.45%  7.96%   47 
Table VII: Event study results. 
This table shows the CARs over various event windows and various subsamples. Here *, **, and *** denote statistic-
al significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. The significance levels for the CARs are based on the standardized 
cross-sectional test of Boehmer et al. (1991), and those for the differences are based on a t-test for equality of means.  
 
    Purchases    Sales 
  #  (0; 1)  (0; 2)  (0; 10)  (0; 20)  #  (0; 1)  (0; 2)  (0; 10)  (0; 20) 
All  34,648  0.29***  0.59***  1.99***  2.97***  65,319  -0.21***  -0.29***  -0.87***  -2.05*** 
Strategic  13,782  0.36***  0.76***  2.54***  3.75***  34,735  -0.25***  -0.38***  -1.05***  -2.55*** 
Nonstrategic  20,866  0.25***  0.49***  1.64***  2.45***  30,584  -0.17***  -0.21***  -0.66***  -1.49*** 
Difference    0.11**  0.27***  0.90***  1.30***    -0.07*  -0.17***  -0.39***  -1.06*** 
Pre-ann.  20,643  0.34***  0.64***  2.16***  3.18***  37,849  -0.19***  -0.24***  -0.91***  -1.99*** 
Non pre-ann.  14,005  0.22***  0.52***  1.76***  2.66***  27,470  -0.23***  -0.35***  -0.81***  -2.14*** 
Difference    0.12**  0.12**  0.40***  0.52***    0.04  0.11**  -0.10  0.14 
Timed  6,472  0.26***  0.40***  1.28***  1.87***  8,793  0.05  0.03  -0.50***  -1.21*** 
Non-timed  28,176  0.30***  0.64***  2.16***  3.22***  56,526  -0.24***  -0.33***  -0.92***  -2.19*** 
Difference    -0.05  -0.23***  -0.88***  -1.34***    0.30***  0.36***  0.43***  0.98*** 
Filed late  8,105  0.31***  0.52***  1.65***  2.69***  14,897  -0.22***  -0.30***  -0.79***  -2.04*** 
Filed in time  25,430  0.27***  0.58***  2.06***  3.02***  47,816  -0.21***  -0.29***  -0.88***  -2.06*** 
Difference    0.04  -0.06  -0.41***  -0.32*    0.00  -0.01  0.09  0.02 
Delay 0–5  1,160  0.92***  1.32***  3.81***  4.52***  780  0.38***  0.35***  -0.01  -1.07*** 
Delay 6–10  3,602  0.31***  0.83***  2.31***  3.35***  4,216  -0.26***  -0.36***  -0.65***  -1.71*** 
Delay 11–5  5,402  0.21***  0.51***  2.07***  2.93***  9,068  -0.13***  -0.19***  -0.86***  -2.01*** 
Delay 16–20  4,833  0.40***  0.69***  2.02***  3.35***  9,760  -0.11***  -0.20***  -0.91***  -2.11*** 
Delay 21–25  5,082  0.39***  0.72***  2.23***  3.36***  11,356  -0.22***  -0.30***  -0.81***  -2.04*** 
Delay 26–30  4,781  0.28***  0.54***  1.57***  2.47***  11,135  -0.31***  -0.46***  -1.05***  -2.32*** 
Delay 31–35  3,943  0.08  0.38***  1.95***  3.12***  8,448  -0.24***  -0.36***  -0.99***  -2.29*** 
Delay 36–40  3,788  -0.03  0.22***  1.67***  2.52***  4,570  -0.32***  -0.44***  -0.80***  -2.45*** 
Delay 41–45  669  0.33***  0.75***  1.15***  1.99***  1,068  -0.23***  -0.15***  -0.69***  -1.52*** 
Delay > 45  3,202  0.38***  0.55***  1.49***  2.40***  4,918  -0.15***  -0.16***  -0.71***  -1.61*** 
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Table VIII: Determinants of CARs (0; 20). 
This table reports the results of a regression with firm-fixed effects of the reporting day CARs (0, 20) on the explana-
tory variables listed in the first column. If several transactions in the same stock were reported on the same day, the 
transactions count as a single observation. A report is classified as a purchase if the net transaction volume reported is 
positive. Tobin‘s Q is calculated as the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of total assets. RoE is net 
income divided by book equity. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities to long-term 
debt plus debt in current liabilities plus stockholder equity. We define Numest as the total number of analysts cover-
ing the company in the month before the reporting date of the insider trade. We calculate TradeVolume as the num-
ber of shares exchanged in the transaction times the transaction price divided by the market equity of the company 
whose stocks were bought or sold in the insider trade. If several trades were reported on the same day, we sum the 
total volume of those trades. We define NumInsider as the total number of insiders who reported their trades in the 
same company on the same day. D_pre-ann. is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the trade (or at least 
one trade, if several trades are reported on the same day) occurs during a period of less than 60 days prior to the next 
earnings announcement; D_timing is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the trade is executed within 
60 days prior to the next earnings announcement and is reported after the announcement (but before the following 
announcement); and D_strategic is set to one when a) the trade is followed by at least one additional trade by the 
same insider before it is reported or if it follows a trade by the same insider that has not yet been reported and when 
b) the market can infer on the reporting date that the trade was strategic (see Figure 3 for an illustration). All other 
trades are classified as nonstrategic. With respect to strategic trades reported in an overlapping way, only serial trans-
actions and not the first one can be identified as strategic. D_timing * D_stra. is an interaction term of the variables 
D_timing and D_strategic. Delay is the trading-volume–weighted average delay of all insider trades of a firm re-
ported on the same day. We classified all insiders into four groups (four variables): D_CEO if the trader is the CEO, 
D_chairman if the trader is the chairman but not the CEO, D_executive if the trader is an executive director but not 
the CEO, and the reference group D_other, which includes all other insider groups. If there were several trades in the 
same stock on the same day, the highest insider position is selected according to the ranking CEO, chairman, execu-
tive, and other. Standard errors are clustered at the reporting day level. Here *, **, and *** denote statistical signific-
ance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
  Purchases  Sales 
Independent variables  Coef.  t-Statistic  Coef.  t-Statistic 
Tobin‘s Q  -1.2663  -6.79***  -0.6351  -7.05*** 
RoE  0.0201  0.45  -0.0157  -0.56 
Leverage  0.4168  1.62  -0.0305  -0.17 
Numest  -0.3112  -4.2***  -0.2987  -5.49*** 
TradeVolume  -7.6341  -0.63  -11.0827  -1.47 
NumInsider  0.3561  3.59***  -0.3868  -4.18*** 
D_pre-ann.  0.9130  3.62***  0.2334  1.04 
D_timing  -0.9636  -2.39**  0.5219  1.42 
D_strategic  0.9047  3.05***  -0.6151  -3.35*** 
D_timing * D_stra.  -0.1863  -0.38  0.0387  0.09 
Delay  -0.0019  -1.55  0.0031  2.09** 
D_CEO  2.3162  6.77***  -0.8353  -2.4** 
D_chairman  1.9570  2.96***  -0.6719  -1.73* 
D_executive  1.0402  3.72***  -0.6146  -2.84*** 
Constant  2.5661  0.96  -1.5233  -0.55 
Year dummies  Included  Included 
Industry dummies  Included  Included 
Observations  34,648  65,319 
Adjusted R²  11.12%  7.99%   49 
Figure 1: Distribution of trading dates over the month. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of reporting dates over the month. 
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Figure 3: Definition of strategic trading 
The figure illustrates our definition of strategic trade reporting. Panel A illustrates the more common case where two 
trades (labeled trade 1 and 2) are executed and then reported jointly. Trade 3 is non-strategic because a) there is no 
unreported trade by the same insider on the trading day and b) trade 3 is reported before the insider makes another 
trade. Panel B illustrates the case of overlapping reports. Trades 1 and 2 are strategic because trade 1 has not yet been 
reported on the day on which trade 2 is executed. However, the trades are not reported jointly. Therefore, on the 
reporting day of trade 1 market participants cannot infer that trade 1 is strategic.  
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